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Abstract
The phenomenon of municipal capitalism, which characterizes many local governments in Italy and
Europe has been subject to many studies, but none have tried to model what this could imply for
the choice of the optimal regulatory rule, nor for the vertical allocation of regulatory tasks among
the various levels of government.
The Author first considers the case in which a benevolent regulator -at the central or local level-
chooses the cost reimbursement rule. Then, the model will be expanded in order to analyze the
effects that a partisan planner has on regulation.
1 Introduction
Starting from the UK in the 1980s, countries all over the world (Bortolotti and Milella, 2006)
began privatizing many local services in the name of rationalizing and reducing public debt
and expenditure (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Bortolotti et al., 2003), as well as increasing
efficiency. So why do governments, especially at the local level, still own shares in these
privatized firms?
Governments still control -through voting rights and/or golden shares- a large portion of
these privatized firms, particularly in strategic sectors such as utilities and transportation
(Boubakri et al., 2009) which are characterized by bigger and more valuable companies.
Privatizing these sectors generally creates public discontent, also because they tend to be
∗margherita.boggio@polimi.it
1
1 Introduction 2
natural monopolies (raising political and regulatory issues). Bortolotti and Faccio (2004)
show that not only have governmental shares not changed over time, but also that this
phenomenon -defined as reluctant privatization- does not seem to have decreased the firms’
market value1 nor their performance. Note that reluctant privatization involves the transfer
of ownership rights, without the contextual transfer of control rights: this divergence can
create a higher risk of expropriation for minority shareholders, and sometimes can make
managers pay higher dividends in order to signal their commitment (Faccio et al., 2001).
Different levels of government are involved: national governments, governmental agencies,
and also local authorities. This is particularly true at the municipal level, with the local
authority acting as the main shareholder in the majority of cases (Boubakri et al., 2005).
A spontaneous question arises: why is this form of ‘capitalism’ mainly a municipal phe-
nomenon. A plausible answer is that the firms operating in some of these sectors (i.e. gas,
electricity) are highly profitable; hence, local administrators can use them to counterbalance
the negative results of firms operating in other (costly) sectors, or to increase their rev-
enues through dividends, using them for other purposes, and helping the local government
to somehow elude budget constraints imposed by the central government2.
Moreover, given that one of the key objectives of privatization is to make profit maxi-
mization the sole objective of the firm while also eliminating the political ones that typically
characterize State Owned Enterprises (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Boycko et al., 1996), the
presence of this residual governmental control can create contrasting objectives.
This gives rise to a twofold issue. The fact that municipal governments still retain high
shares in the firms they should have privatized and that they usually still regulate, decreases
not only the transparency of their relation with the firm’s manager (since they can distribute
rents across players and also have better access to the manager’s information), but also the
transparency to their electorate, since the local government’s political orientation can change
the effect on outcomes, depending whether the political agenda is aligned or not with its
objectives as a shareholder.
The present paper will approach a very common problem in regulation: the choice of the
cost reimbursement rule under incomplete information regarding the efficiency of the firm.
This is used to compare how the central and local levels of government perform in giving
incentives to the manager, in order to understand the effectiveness of the privatization process
1 The hypothesis is that the goverments’ reluctance to privatize should negatively affect the firm’s market
value. In the empirical analysis, the variable used to compare the firm’s market value of the reluctantly
privatized firms with respect to their completely private counterparts is the market-to-book ratio, which is
defined as the ratio of market value of ordinary and preferred equity to the book value of equity.
2 As hypothesized by Bianchi et al. (2010) in the case of Italy.
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taking into account the fact that the local government has a special link with the manager,
since it is also a member of the shareholders board. The element of political inefficiency
will also be considered: regulators have a private agenda, and they can use regulatory policy
to favour that group of citizens which supports them. In this case, the fact that the local
government is a shareholder can either provide support for the political objectives if it is
pro-shareholder, or can create conflict when it is pro-consumer.
The next Section gives an overview of the literature on federalism, regulation and political
economy, highlighting the points they have in common or which can be linked in order to
explain the above mentioned issues. Section 3 presents the institutional details of the problem
at hand. In Section 4, the basic model is presented. In Section 5, the model will be extended
allowing for a non-benevolent government. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
As already mentioned, privatization has had the multipurpose of reaching gains in efficiency,
avoiding wastes, improving performance, and relieving the State budget. In parallel, the
academic debate on ownership structure -starting from Sappington and Stiglitz privatization
theorem (1987)- has flourished.
Traditionally, ownership issues have been studied using the principal-agent theory (see
Shapiro and Willig, 1990; Laffont and Tirole, 1993) or the contract incompleteness approach
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Schmidt,1996)3.
However, the government often has its own objectives, such as obtaining and maintaining
political support which leads to behaviors that are very different from welfare maximization.
This means that inefficiencies can also come from the fact that politicians apply policies
which are meant to win the support of their voters, while interest groups may try to corrupt
them to obtain higher rents4. The Chicago and Virginia schools (1970-80s) were the first to
give a theoretical treatment of the problem of lobbying, which was later modeled through
the principal-agent approach (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) and the contract incompleteness
approach (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Recently, the topic has been integrated with po-
litical economy issues such as voting (Faulhaber, 2003; Mu, 2009) and political accountability
3 In the first case, the problem is that the firm’s objective, profit maximization, is different and usually
at odds with the government’s objective of welfare maximization, and the shareholders are typically more
informed than the bureaucrats. In the second case, the problem is the impossibility of a credible commitment.
4 The importance of the problem of political connections per se, their bidirectionality, and the fact that
they can entail many forms of preferential treatment, is a central topic for economists (Shleifer and Vishny,
1994; Faccio, 2006).
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(Besley and Coate, 2003; Guerriero, 2008).
Thus, it is apparent that a regulatory issue such as the choice of ownership structure
cannot be analyzed without also taking into consideration the nature and causes of the ties
between politicians and firms: note that it is the presence of asymmetric information that
makes these links possible. Laffont (1996) and Martimort (2006) show how the regulatory
process is not only characterized by economic inefficiencies (i.e. asymmetric information on
the efficiency parameter of the firm), but also by some form of contractual incompleteness
(e.g. non-benevolent politician, limited commitment) influencing the way information is
distributed and consequently also the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction.
Traditionally, the main concern in regulation has been the choice of the optimal regu-
latory rule. However, some general statements in the literature on fiscal federalism can be
also applied to regulatory policies (Trillas, 2008): it is important not only to choose the best
regulatory rule, but also to study which is the most appropriate (vertical) level of implemen-
tation.
From Oates’ decentralization theorem (1972), a central question in federalism has been
which tasks and responsibilities5 should be decentralized and to what degree. As privati-
zation, fiscal federalism has been implemented in many countries all over the world in an
attempt to restructure the public sector, thereby increasing the autonomy and efficiency of
the lower levels of government.
Starting from these considerations, it can be said that the vertical allocation of powers
can increase the efficiency of regulation (Laffont, 2000, ch.9); nevertheless, the fact that the
local government is also a shareholder will likely modify the effect a federalist approach on
regulation.
Moreover, it should be taken into account that the level of (de)centralization can have
different implications for the degree of influence that citizens are able to exert on politicians.
This is why more recently, the problems of lobbying (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000;
Bordignon et al., 2005) and political accountability (Seabright, 1996; Laffont and Pouyet,
2003; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 2007) have been dealt with a federalist approach. An
important question to ask is which is the better level with which to deal with capture and
which provides the best political accountability.
Many elements concur with the decision of the best regulatory level, where centripetal and
5 It has always been argued that local governments, being closer to the citizens in their districts, have
better knowledge of their preferences (but also of local costs and demand), and can provide a combination
of services and taxes more coherent with local needs, even if they are limited by the inability to internalize
the possible spillover effects and to exploit the economics of scale. For an exhaustive survey on the topic, see
Oates (1999, 2005).
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centrifugal forces seem to coexist (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). Local regulators have a better
knowledge of local conditions (Trosken, 1996); but more cooperation between vertical levels,
and redistribution between horizontal levels are still needed. Moreover, while it is easier for
interest groups to organize and capture the local regulator, and they have a greater interest
in doing so (Easterbrook, 1983), given that the stakes involved are higher, decentralization
may be the only way to limit the power of the Leviathan6 (i.e. central government).
In conclusion, we need to identify whether a central or a local politician is more suitable for
dealing with the regulated firm. This cooperation between the traditional topics of regulation
and the federalist approach has given start to what has been defined as ‘regulatory federalism’
(Trillas, 2008). This approach can be useful not only in finding out which is the best level
for dealing with the policy distortions resulting from lobbies, but also in understanding if the
subsidiarity principle is effective, and/or if there should be a stronger role of the regulator at
the European level.
Although municipal capitalism7 is likely to be an important issue for policy-makers, as
far as the Author knows, there are no theoretical contributions on the topic.
Branco and Mello (1991) and Perotti (1995), focus on political motivations, within the
more general topic of partial privatization; they demonstrate that the gradualness and un-
derpricing of sales to private investors are used by politicians as signals of being a committed
government. However, they start from the assumption that in the end all shares will be
relinquished, yet this is not what happens in reality, and this fact is likely to raise questions
on the firm’s efficiency and of the role of the regulator.
A second issue to further consider is that capitalism is mainly a local phenomenon; a
comparison of local and central regulation, taking this fact into account, seems to be missing
in the existing literature. The model in Section 4 is orientated on the regulatory side (or,
better, on the side of regulatory federalism): the main objective is to compare the outcomes
(in efficiency, citizens’ surplus and managerial rent) of local regulation, with shares in the
regulated firm, to those coming from the regulation of a central planner with no stakes in
the regulated firm.The fact of being a shareholder changes the local government’s attitude
towards the agents in the economic system: when regulation is implemented by a central or
a local politician, the difference is visible not only in terms of welfare maximization, but also
of informational advantages.
6 In Brennan e Buchanan (1980), the public sector is seen as a unique entity (the Leviathan), seeking to
maximize its own objectives (i.e. income and prestige); hence its target is to expand, maximizing the income
from the economy. From this point of view, decentralization can be a tool to limit its power.
7 This is how the phenomenon of ownership and control of private firms from local Italian governments
has been defined in Bianchi et al. (2010).
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A very interesting step towards the link between decentralization, regulation and political
accountability has been taken in the paper by Laffont and Pouyet (2003). However, in their
model, they study what happens when there is a unique firm in the federation, and either a
sole central regulator or two local competing regulators.
The Author will apply a methodology similar to Laffont and Pouyet to study what hap-
pens when a firm exists in each of the two regions of the federation connected to one another
through a network, and with shares solely owned by the citizens of their own region. In
this way the spillover would not be informational or on the rent received by the shareholders
(as in the mentioned model), but related to the network. Hence, the focus would be on the
trade-off between the internalization of the spillovers provided by the central regulator and
the (informational) advantages brought by the special link between the local planner and the
firm’s manager.
In one sense, in the environment just described, when there is a central regulator is like
having complete privatization, and the regulator can only exert external control.When the
regulator is at the local level, even if formally the firm has been privatized, the local gov-
ernment also has (some) internal control in the firm. With a local regulator, there is a
trade-off between the advantage of having better knowledge of the local conditions and the
drawback of an unclear relation between the firm and the regulator. This trade-off can be
somewhat exacerbated when the politician is partisan, depending on which category of citi-
zens is favoured by the political party in power. It is also interesting to see how this interacts
with the fact that a regulator is local, and consequently how this modifies the above men-
tioned behaviour. In order to implement political issues in a typical regulatory environment
characterized by asymmetric information, the Author will follow the methodology in Laffont
(1996) and Martimort (2006).
Note that up to now, the Author has emphasized the importance of the model in order to
compare the regulator at the central level with the local one; however, the model can be also
applied to the European Union, comparing the regulation provided by the Commission, with
the one by the single countries in order to investigate the efficacy and the reasonableness of
the subsidiarity principle.
3 Institutional details
As pointed out by Bortolotti and Milella (2006), more than 4,000 privatizations have taken
place worldwide between 1997-2004, with 29% of the total deals implemented in Western
Europe. Even if in general privatization seems to have been reached, since the average of
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Tab. 1: Ownership structure for the sample of privatized firms.
Type of investors N Mean T-statistics
Total Sample PC board NC board (*** Significance at the 1% level)
Government 213 31.95 45.27 24.86 − 5.29***
Local institutions 172 24.65 23.01 25.46 0.59
Foreign investors 195 15.82 9.05 19.37 3.52***
Employees 156 6.16 5.14 6.60 0.80
Individuals 170 18.35 16.17 19.42 1.12
capital sold attains 60%, looking at the deals through public offers (which involve the largest
and more profitable firms), it is striking that the average capital sold decreases to 35%, with
the majority of stakes being abandoned only in 21% of the cases.
It is interesting to look at how ownership structure has changed after privatization:
Boubakri et al. (2008) provide a summary for their sample of privatized firms from all
over the world over the period 1980-2002 (see Table 1). The table presents the average per-
centage of ownership in the three years after privatization divided by type of shareholder:
mean ownership is provided for the total sample, but also for the 2 subsamples of firms with
politically connected (PC) and non-connected (NC) boards. The last column provides the
T-statistic for the difference in means.
First, it is important to note that, after privatization, significant shares are still owned by
local institutions. Second, we see that the mean ownership (for local authorities only) does
not change among sub-samples, and the difference is not statistically significant. To explain
this it would be best to concentrate more on political competition than on corruption per
se, since it does not seem to be a determinant in partial privatizations (at the local level).
On the one hand, reluctant privatization can be linked to the degree of political competition
faced by the ruling party in the jurisdiction (Dinç and Gupta, 2007), while on the other hand,
the political orientation can make a government more or less prone to privatization (Perotti,
1995).
In a previous paper, Boubakri et al. (2005) deepen the analysis on the determinants
and the composition of shareholders in privatized firms. First, they note that while central
government ownership decreases over time, in parallel local authority shares increase so that
they seem to appropriate the stakes relinquished by the State.
Table 2 presents the change in public ownership and in the concentration between the
three largest private shareholders, in a sample of 209 firms from 25 emerging markets and 14
industrialized countries privatized between 1980 and 2001.
3 Institutional details 8
Tab. 2: The ownership structure before and after privatization.
Ownership share Ownership share after privatization
one year (year relative to privatization)
before privatization 0 +1 +2 +3
Type of institution
Government (Mean) 77.01 35.78 31.13 26.06 21.85
Government (N) 198 201 192 181 161
Local institutions (Mean) 6.13 20.94 24.87 26.65 30.24
Local institutions (N) 127 126 144 145 111
Private ownership
concentration
Cumulative share of the
three largest investors
(Mean)
10.29 33.15 37.30 39.86 40.94
Cumulative share of the
three largest investors (N)
159 160 170 165 132
Herfindahl index (Mean) 3.11 16.28 17.84 19.11 19.42
They show that the local authorities are the investors which have mostly benefited from
privatization, with the main concentration in those countries with poorer investor protection
(civil law countries): thus, among others, European countries (except for the UK) are likely
to be affected by this phenomenon.
In particular, while prior to privatization the average government stake was 78.7% in
common law countries and 76.1% in civil law countries, the difference is not statistically
significant; after privatization, the average stake is statistically lower in civil law countries
with respect to common law countries. Thus, central governments in civil law countries
seem to sell high portions of their shares faster. Yet, after privatization, the higher stakes
are in the hands of local authorities in civil law countries, somehow substituting the central
government. Three years after privatization the average stakes in firms in civil law countries
is 37.2%, while in common law countries it is 18.6%.
A recent study by the European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public
services (CEEP) shows that in Europe, in which most countries are civil law, services charac-
terized by infrastructure networks provide on average 9.4% of jobs in the EU27 (in particular,
electricity, gas and water 2%, while transport 4%), with a higher than average employment
from firms in central/eastern EU countries. They also contribute to 4.8% of EU GDP.
In the majority of European countries, municipalities organize utilities in communal en-
terprises, serving the local jurisdiction; they can be the sole property of a municipality, in
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Tab. 3: Local Public Enterprises in Europe.
Austria Belgium Germany Estonia France Greece Italy Poland Sweden
N 1,450 243 3,500 224 1,198 1,116 963 2,415 1,750
Personnel 44,000 27,250 53,000 10,900 66,426 27,500 152,662 160,402 55,000
comanagement with various municipalities, or in co-participation with private agents. In the
latter case, the municipality has a minority stake in a growing portion of cases. Examples of
States with this kind of organizations are Germany, France, Austria, Poland, Estonia, Italy,
but also Northern countries (See Table 3). Thanks to the evolution of the decentralization
and privatization processes, mixed local companies seem to be developing in most of the
European countries.
Due to the important role of the local authorities in partial privatization, especially
in strategic sectors and in civil law countries such as the European ones, more empirical
and theoretical work8 should be devoted to the topic given the regulatory, political and
institutional issues they can raise.
4 The basic model
To present the regulatory issue, the Author will use the regulatory structure in Laffont
and Tirole (1993), which has been adopted by both Laffont (1996) and Laffont and Pouyet
(2003). The basic framework that deals with the choice of the cost reimbursement rule
under asymmetric information is by Laffont and Tirole, to which Laffont adds the element of
malevolent regulator and, later, together with Pouyet, the elements of regional competition
and regulatory federalism.
As in the model by Laffont and Pouyet, the Author will consider a federation (or a
country) composed of two regions, denoted by i = 1, 2, with the same number of citizens,
with a mass unity, and whose preferences are homogeneous. However, while in the mentioned
model, there is a single firm implementing a project for each of the two regions (creating
competition between local regulators), in the present model, there is a (monopolistic) firm
implementing an indivisible project in each of the two regions.
The regulator fully reimburses the observable production costs Ci = (βi−ei)qi to the firm:
total production costs are equal to the marginal costs (βi−ei) of production multiplied by the
8 A thorough discussion of the problem and of stylized facts for 2005 is provided by Bianchi et al. (2010),
for Italy. However, even in this case, an empirical analysis is missing.
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quantities produced qi, while fixed costs are normalized to zero, since they are assumed to be
known. Thus, the (marginal) cost of the project depends on the efficiency in production βi
and the level of effort of the firm’s manager ei. When asymmetric information is introduced,
the efficiency parameter βi is the manager’s private information. For simplicity, let us assume
that βi can have two values (high or low): β and β, with probability ν and 1−ν respectively.
Naturally β > β, and we can define ∆β = β − β.
The manager can exert a (positive) effort ei in order to reduce the marginal cost of
the project, but this effort generates a disutility ψ(ei) for him. This disutility of effort is
increasing and convex in effort (i.e. it increases at an increasing rate), so that ψ′ > 0 and
ψ′′ > 0.
The firm is run by a manager, who responds to the shareholders, hence his utility is
given by Ui = ti − ψ(ei) − zi. The transfer ti is given to the firm by the regulator and is
financed through a tax on citizens which implies a distortionary effect for each monetary
unit levied, represented by λ, the so-called shadow cost of public funds. The dividends to
the shareholders are denoted by zi. The reservation utility of the manager is normalized to
zero.
The regulator and the shareholders simultaneously and non cooperatively offer a contract
to the firm’s manager so that he accepts to work: the regulator offers the manager the transfer
ti, while the shareholders design the dividend scheme zi.
The consumers’ net surplus generated by the project is equal to V Ci = δS(qi) − (1 +
λ) [ti + Ci] in the case of regulation by the central government, while it is V Di = S(qi) −
(1 + λ) [ti + Ci] under decentralization of the regulatory function. The difference is that the
central government can fully internalize the effects of the project entailing spillover δ (which
can be less or greater than 1 depending on whether is is negative or positive) on the gross
surplus S(qi), while the local government cannot. The Author decided to add the spillover
element in the model, since this kind of services (i.e. utilities) are usually provided through
a network, implying some sort of externality between the jurisdictions.
Note that, as in Laffont (1996), portion α ∈ [0, 1] of these citizens-consumers-taxpayers
also owns some shares of the firm in their district; therefore, they are also shareholders.
As we will see later in this paper, with this assumption we are dividing the population
between rich and poor, and partisanship not only has an opportunistic connotation, but also
an ideological one: the politician who favours consumers-only is left-wing, viceversa if he
favours citizens-shareholders.
However, in the model presented in the next Sections, in order to represent the phe-
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Tab. 4: The social welfare components under central and local regulation.
Central government Local government
Citizens’ surplus V Ci = δS(qi)− (1 + λ) [ti + Ci] V Di = S(qi)− (1 + λ) [ti + Ci]
Manager’s utility Ui = ti − ψ(ei)− zi
Citizens’ dividends αzi
Government’s dividends 0 (1− α)zi
nomenon under consideration, local government also has some dividends (1− α)zi from the
(1 − α) shares owned in the local firm; they are used to increase the budget. For example,
the money in excess can be used to finance a local public good, or to increase the quality
of the network used by the firm. Thus, this portion of dividends appears as an additional
component in the social welfare function when the regulatory function is in the hands of the
local government.
Note that the (im)possibility of internalizing spillovers and the additional component
in the maximization process are not the only differences in the regulatory levels. If the
government is not one of the owners (i.e. as in the case of central regulation), it will weigh
the shareholders’ utility zi using the parameter α, while if it is the owner of the residual
shares (i.e. as in the case of local regulation), shareholders profits will be fully weighed (since
it will weigh the part owned by the citizens plus its own shares, which sum to one). In the
latter case, it will also choose the retention rate (defined as the percentage of present earnings
held back by the firm) r ∈ [0, 1] on the dividends to be distributed. Table 4 illustrates the
different components of the welfare function taken into consideration by the central/local
regulator.
Assuming, as in Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Martimort (2006), that the ownership
structure either allows or does not allow the regulator to control communication channels
between the manager and outsiders (i.e. the shareholders), this has a slightly different im-
plication for our model.
Given that the central government has no shares in the firms, it can only exert the
external control, then privatization is ‘full’: thereby, the regulator weighs the shareholders’
net dividends only on the basis of their ‘voting’ portion in the population. Moreover, the
manager faces two principals: the shareholders (internal control) and the regulator (external
control).
Under decentralization, the local government can exert both types of control, but only
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proportionally to its shares (we can think that internal control is exerted through represen-
tatives in a board).
Note that in the present model, central and local governments do not communicate, hence
the local government does not provide the central authority with access to its privileged
information.
4.1 Complete information
In this section, symmetric information is assumed: the value βi of the efficiency parameter
for each of the two firms is known, so the manager’s effort level ei is observable. The Author
will compare the outcomes obtained under central and local regulation in the full information
benchmark.
4.1.1 Central government
When regulation is implemented by the central government, spillover effects on consumers
surplus are taken into account, but the utility of the shareholders is only considered for that
portion of the firm’s shares that are owned by citizens, while the utility related to the shares
still owned by the local government is not taken into consideration.
max
(qi,ei)
2∑
i=1
{
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)(ti + Ci) + αzi + Ui
}
(1)
s.t. V Ci = δS(qi)− (1 + λ) [ti + Ci]i > 0, Ui > 0, zi > 0, with i = 1, 2.
The central politician maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, consisting of the
weighted sum of the utilities of citizens, manager, and shareholders, under the participation
constraints of these three groups. The participation constraints for the citizens are needed
so they do not move to another area (i.e. voting with their feet9).
W =
2∑
i=1
{
δS(qi)− (1 + λ) [(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi]− λαzi − λUi
}
(2)
Maximization leads to the following results:
1. No rent to the firms’ managers, since it is costly: U1 = U2 = 0. Thus, ti = ψ(ei) + zi,
for i = 1, 2.
9 Tiebout (1956) envisaged the possibility that citizens, through interjurisdictional mobility, could choose
the community with the preferred combination of tax and local good, imposing in this way additional re-
straints on the central government’s powers.
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2. Marginal disutility equal to marginal cost savings of effort: ψ′(ei) = qi. As a result,
e1 = e2 = e
∗: effort is equal in the two areas and reaches the socially optimal level.
3. S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi−ei
δ
: in both regions the marginal utility of the public good equates its
marginal cost, and spillovers are internalized.
4. The project is undertaken and the citizens’ participation constraints in both areas are
satisfied if and only if: δS(qi)− (1 + λ) [(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi] > 0.
4.1.2 Local government
The local regulator only takes into account the welfare of the players in his area, not inter-
nalizing the spillovers on the citizens’ gross surplus. However, given that he still retains some
shares in the local firm, not only does he fully weigh the shareholders’ utility, but he also
adds an additional element to his social welfare function that represents the monetary value
he receives from the shares owned. This last element depends on the level of the retention
rate r: that is, the portion of present earnings of the firm that the board of shareholders
decides not to distribute as dividends. Since the local government is also a shareholder, it
has an optimal retention rate which is obtained from the maximization problem.
max
(qi,ei)
S(qi)− (1 + λ)(ti + Ci) + zi + Ui + (1− α)(1− r)zi (3)
s.t. V Di = S(qi)− (1 + λ) [ti + Ci] > 0, Ui > 0, zi > 0, with i = 1, 2.
Wi = S(qi)− (1 + λ) [(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)]− λUi − λzi + (1− α)(1− r)zi (4)
The managers’ zero rent and optimal effort results are the same as described above except
for the fact that now S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi − ei: spillovers cannot be internalized by local government.
Furthermore, now the government (also a shareholder), has control of the additional
variable of dividends and chooses the retention rate r, so that r = 1 − λ
1−α
10. The selected
retention rate decreases with the second component on the right hand side of the equation
which can be seen as savings in terms of the social cost of public fund that can be achieved
if government dividends instead of (socially costly) taxes are used to finance local public
goods. In other words, the higher the social cost of public funds λ, the more costly is the use
of taxes. Hence it becomes more convenient for the benevolent local government to use its
10 Under the assumption that λ ≤ 1−α, financing the project with taxes is less/equally costly than financing
it through dividends.
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portion of dividends in order to finance the transfer to the firm: consequently, the retention
rate decreases.
The results, under complete information for the rent of the manager (1) and for the effort
levels (2), are standard.
The (im)possibility of internalizing spillover effects (3) and the necessity of fulfilling the
citizens’ participation constraints (4) arise from the fact that the federalist approach has
been implemented in the model.
Finally, shareholders’ dividends are introduced in the model in a way that is different
with respect to the orthodox model: one portion (the one obtained by ‘rich’ citizens) is
considered by both regulators, while the other portion is taken into account only when
regulation is implemented by the government which also owns the residual shares (i.e. the
local government).
Proposition 1. Under full information, centralization is equivalent to decentralization,
except for the fact that spillovers cannot be internalized. The level of efforts are symmetric
and equal to the socially optimal effort, and in both cases its marginal disutility is equalized
to its marginal cost savings. Moreover, the firms’ managers never get any rent.
4.2 Incomplete information
In this Section asymmetric information on the efficiency parameter βi is introduced, hence
the regulator only observes the realized cost Ci, and bases the net transfer on it. The
rent for the efficient type -necessary to avoid mimicking the inefficient one- is denoted by
Φ(ei) = ψ(ei) − ψ(ei −∆βi), and depends on the level of effort required by the manager in
the inefficient firm. For notational simplicity, ti ≡ ti(βi), Ci ≡ Ci(βi), etc.
4.2.1 Central government
Now the planner (for details of the solution see Appendix B) should maximize the expected
social welfare under the aggregate veto constraints:
max
(q
i
,qi,ei,ei)
2∑
i=1
{
δ
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
+
− (1 + λ)[ν((β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]− λνΦ(ei)
}
(5)
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s.t.11
δS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> δS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(6)
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν [2λ+ (1− α)]
1− ν Φ(ei) > 0 (7)
Maximizing expected social welfare we obtain:
1. ∂L
∂qi
= 0 : S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi−ei
δ
⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
2. ∂L
∂q
i
= 0 :
S′(q
i
)
1+λ
=
β
i
−ei
δ
⇔ q
i
= q∗(β
i
− ei).
3. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : q
i
= ψ′(ei) ⇔ ei = e∗.
4. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)− (1−α)µ(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei) ⇔ eCi < e∗.
5. U i = Φ(ei) > 0, ti = ψ(e∗i ) + zi + Φ(ei).
6. U i = 0, t = ψ(ei) + zi.
Since the expected cost of the informational rent given to the efficient firm, νλΦ(ei), depends
only on ei, the levels of qi and ei are equal to those obtained under full information, while
qi = q
∗(βi − ei). Thus, quantities are not distorted in order to give the right incentives to
the efficient firm’s manager. The levels of effort and output for the efficient firm are the
same as under symmetric information, but now the manager enjoys the informational rent;
in order to limit the amount of this rent, the incentive scheme given to the inefficient firm is
low-powered so that the level of effort is distorted downwards.
The level of distortion is greater than in the classical case of cost-reimbursement (see
Laffont and Tirole (1993)): part of the additional distortion is visible in the second element
on the right hand side of the equation and is due to the presence of the multiprincipal
problem12 (following the results obtained by Martimort (2006)), given that the internal and
11 The aggregate veto constraint (7) is binding with µ(1− ν) as multiplier.
12 In this case, an Agent reports to several Principals (each offering a direct truthful mechanism) with
conflicting interests; hence the Revelation Principle must be revised. Now that communication with other
Principals is important, direct mechanisms which satisfy individual incentive compatibility and participation
constraints are not useful to describe this game of non-cooperating multiprincipals: aggregate constraints are
necessary so that coalitions do not form in order to manipulate informational reports.
This model is called a Common Agency Model, or a Multiprincipals Model. Martimort and Stole (1998)
suggested the use of the Taxation Principle to characterize the set of equilibria: direct mechanisms are
equivalent to a nonlinear transfer based on the observable cost, C, of the firm.
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external control of the firm are split between the shareholders and regulator. In order not
to have any of the two principals that veto the inefficient firm’s production, an increased
distortion is needed. This also means that when the firm is inefficient its budget constraints
is harder, since it has to respond to the requirements of two principals. Thus, while on the
one hand there are additional distortions, on the other hand, the budget constraint for the
inefficient firm is enforced.
However, the distortion is even greater than in Martimort’s model, since the central
government does not weigh the residual shares in its social welfare function, and this distortion
is represented by the last element on the right hand side of the equation. Note that the
residual shares are those owned by the local government, so not taking them into account
further distorts the results. In practice, the central government discards the possibility
of cooperation with the lower level of government which could somehow help to solve the
multiprincipal problem. Instead, not only is the local government treated by the central
planner as a normal shareholder, but its utility is not taken into account, thereby creating
an additional element of distortion.
Proposition 2. Under asymmetric information and central regulation, spillovers are
internalized and outputs are chosen so that the marginal disutility of effort is equalized to
its marginal cost savings either with an efficient or an inefficient firm. The level of effort is
socially optimal in the case of the efficient firm, while it is lower than optimal if the firm is
inefficient. In the first case, the firm gets an informational rent.
4.2.2 Local government
As already pointed out, in the complete information case, the local planner -in contrast to the
central regulator- fully weighs the shareholders’ utility and has an additional element in the
social welfare function representing the monetary value of its shares of distributed dividends.
Thus, the problem (for details see Appendix B) he must solve is:
max
(q
i
,qi,ei,ei)
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)− (1 + λ)ν[((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))+
+ (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]− λνΦ(ei) (8)
The Agent chooses his announcement to maximize his utility, while the Principals play a Nash equilibrium
choosing the best contract given the choices of the others. Naturally, if the activities required by the Principals
are complements or substitutes in the Agent’s utility function, his rent is reduced/increased. The Agent’s
response to a contract from Principal 1 depends on the contract offered by Principal 2.
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s.t.13
S(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(9)
S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν2λ
1− νΦ(ei) + (1− α)(1− r)
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0 (10)
The results of the maximization process are the following:
1. ∂L
∂qi
= 0 : S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi − ei ⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
2. ∂L
∂q
i
= 0 :
S′(q
i
)
1+λ
= β
i
− ei ⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
3. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : q
i
= ψ′(ei) ⇔ ei = e∗.
4. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei) + (1−α)(1−r)µ(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)⇔ eCi < eLi < e∗.
5. U i = Φ(ei) > 0, ti = ψ(e∗i ) + zi + Φ(ei).
6. U i = 0, t = ψ(ei) + zi.
As for the rent given to the efficient firm, the levels of output, and the level of effort for
the efficient firm, the results are the same obtained by the central planner.
Regarding for the inefficient firm’s effort, a higher distortion still exists due to the mul-
tiprincipal problem, but the second distortion of the centralized case is eliminated since the
dividends are now fully weighed in the social welfare function. Finally, if the inefficient firm’s
production is not vetoed, some dividends could be distributed to the local government and
therefore it is more ‘balanced’ towards the shareholders, mitigating the multiprincipal prob-
lem. This is visible in the third element on the right hand side of the equation at point 4.
The optimal retention rate does not change.
Proposition 3. Under asymmetric information and local regulation, outputs are chosen
so that the marginal disutility of effort is equalized to its marginal cost savings either with
an efficient or an inefficient firm. The level of effort is socially optimal in the case of an
efficient firm (and the firm receives an informational rent), while it is lower than optimal
13 (10) is binding with µ(1− ν) as multiplier.
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(but higher than in the centralized case) if the firm is inefficient: the fact that the politician
takes into consideration the values of his dividends in the social welfare function mitigates
the distortion created by the multiprincipal problem under asymmetric information. As usual,
spillovers cannot be internalized.
Under asymmetric information and a benevolent government, the central regulator can
internalize the spillover effects while the local regulator can obtain a higher level of effort
from the inefficient firm thanks to its privileged access to information (given that the local
government is on the shareholders board).
In Boubakri et al. (2005) the empirical analysis results show that ownership by a local
authority has a positive (even if insignificant) impact on the firm’s performance, also with
respect to central government ownership. This could mean that spillover effects are less
important than the better knowledge of local conditions available to local institutions, and
this beneficial effect can only be magnified if the local shareholder is a regulator as well.
These results should be put together with the fact that the presence of residual stakes
in public hands increases the probability of political connections on the firm’s management
board (Boubakri et al., 2008), even if results on how this affects the firm’s performance
are mixed (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2004; Boubakri et al., 2008). Indeed, the interaction of
the government level and the political factor could completely change the results. This is
something still missing in the empirical literature on partial privatization.
4.3 Decentralization and the shadow costs of public funds
In this Section, let’s assume that λ is higher at the local level. There can be many ways to
justify this assumption. It can be due, for example, to the fact that even if the tax is decided
by the local regulator it is then collected by the central government which imposes some
constraint or retains a portion of the collected tax, thus increasing the distortion needed to
achieve the same results than under central regulation. In the Italian case, the increase in λ
could represent the tightness imposed by the so-called Patto di Stabilità e Crescita.
In this case, the fact that the local government owns shares in the firm and is willing to
use the resulting revenues is further justified: the more the shadow costs of public funds are
high at the local level, the less the retention rate chosen by the local government.
Another way to see the problem can be taken from the literature on fiscal federalism (Keen
and Kotsogiannis, 2004; Wigger and Wharta, 2004). It has been shown that introducing an
additional level of government can generate the so-called ‘vertical tax externality’: when
the tax power is divided between different levels of government, each level does not fully
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take into account the erosion of the tax base at the next level when imposing taxes and the
related welfare effects. In other words, we can imagine that, giving the local government the
power to regulate and tax (while some powers14 would still remain at the central government
level), the vertical tax externality would reduce the tax revenue collected by each level of
government, given the presence of the tax base erosion effect on the other tax levels. This
is why the local government, to collect the same amount of taxes as the central government,
imposes a greater distortion on the citizens. This does not happen when all the regulation
and taxation instruments are in the hands of the central government.
Note that the horizontal tax externality, which moves in the opposite direction, has not
been considered, since it is assumed (see Section 3.1) that citizens cannot vote with their
feet15.
Consider first our environment under complete information. In this case, the increase in
λ with a local regulator has effect only on S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi−ei
δ
: i.e. producing the local public good
has an increased cost. On the basis of this result, asking if it is better to have a central or
a local regulator (under symmetric information), centralization is justified not only by the
possibility of internalizing the spillovers mentioned in Proposition 1, but also by the fact that
the use of taxation causes less distortions than under local regulation. This effect remains
unchanged also when asymmetric information is introduced.
However, adding asymmetric information to the model, a different level of λ, at this point
has an effect also on the levels of effort and on the distortion of the less efficient firm. To
calculate the change imposed by an increase in λ to the marginal disutility of effort at local
level, total differentiation is used to obtain:
∂L/∂ei
∂λ
= − 1
(1+λ)2
1+2µ
1+µ
ν
1−νΦ
′(ei)− 1(1+λ)2 (1−α)(1−r)µ1+µ ν1−νΦ′(ei).
Thus, the fact that the shadow costs of public funds are higher at the local level decreases
the beneficial effect of having a local regulator who is also on the shareholders board, and the
distance between the effort levels of the inefficient firm’s manager with a central and local
regulator is diminished (i.e. eLi decreases).
14 For example, a public goods as national defense should still be in the hands of the central planner, and
consequently the central government should also impose some kind of taxes to finance it.
15 With horizontal externalities, the various jurisdictions decrease their tax rates to attract the mobile tax
base. This often leads to a race to the bottom, as each area neglects the harm it does to the others.
5 Partisan politicians 20
5 Partisan politicians
Politicians can be biased toward a special group of the population for their political support.
This Section will not consider the hypothesis of a well-intentioned planner, assuming instead
that he is interested in the outcome of the electoral process: he can be pro-shareholder or
pro-consumer, favouring the group that supports him.
In the present model, consumers in each area are randomly split in two groups: those who
are only consumers, and those who also own some shares in the regional firm, in portion 1−α
and α, respectively. Given the fact that part of the population is classified as ‘consumers
only’, while another part has shares in the firm (they can also benefit from the shareholders’
utility, zi), this can be seen as a way to divide the population between poor and rich; thus,
the fact that the government is pro-consumer or pro-shareholder can be seen as an ideological
stance (i.e. left or right wing).
Before the government is elected, the level of regulatory (de)centralization is chosen.
Depending on whether αi > 1/2 or not, the government will commit to govern favouring
consumer-shareholders or consumers only, and it will care only about the well-being of the
citizens which represent the majority.
In Laffont (1996) the same democratic process is assumed, but it is not used -as in the
present model- to compare the different behaviours and outcomes from the various levels of
government. Laffont introduces the election stage to check the effects or the lack of the choice
of ownership structure. The influence of partisanship on the decentralization of regulatory
functions is instead studied -using the same democratic framework- in Laffont and Pouyet
(2003).
5.1 Complete information
Consider first the complete information benchmark under the partisan planner, for both
the central and local government. Under symmetric information, pricing discrimination is
possible (i.e. the tax payed by the poor citizens is different from that payed by the rich
ones). This will be impossible under asymmetric information because of ex-post incentive
compatibility.
In Laffont (1996) it is shown that, under complete information and a partisan planner,
the solution is the same as under normative analysis (i.e. benevolent planner), except that
the citizens in the majority appropriate all the surplus. Moreover, in this context, ownership
structure is neutral. In this Section it will demonstrated that similar results are obtained in
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the model presented here: the citizens represented by the politician in power capture all the
welfare, and the federalist structure (decentralized versus centralized) does not matter.
5.1.1 Central government
Partisanship under a central informed regulator is considered first (for the procedure used to
solve the model, see Appendix C).
Pro-shareholder
A pro-shareholder central planner will maximize the weighted sum of the net surplus (inter-
nalizing the spillovers) for the portion of ‘rich’ (R) consumers, together with the utility these
citizens get from being shareholders of the firm, as well as the manager’s utility. As for the
‘poor’ (P) citizens, only their participation constraint is considered.
Note that in this case the weight that the central planner gives to the shareholders’ utility,
zi, is the same as if he were benevolent. This is due to different motivations: in the present
case, he uses the weight, α, because it represents that portion of the electorate he wants to
favour (i.e. citizen-shareholders), while in the case of the benevolent planner, this behavior
is due to the fact that he does not want to fully weigh the shareholders’ utility, but at the
same time he recognizes the importance of this element for part of the population.
max
(qi,ei)
2∑
i=1
{
δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)α(tRi + Ci) + αzi + Ui
}
(11)
s.t. (1− α)Vi = (1− α)
[
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)(tPi + Ci)
]
> 0,
Ui = αt
R
i + (1− α)tPi − ψ(ei)− zi > 0,
zi ≥ 0, for i=1,2.
When maximizing the social welfare function under the participation constraints of the
poor citizens, the manager and all the shareholders, the expected welfare is obtained as:
W =
2∑
i=1
{
δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)− (1− α)zi − 1− α
1 + λ
δS(qi)
]
− λαzi − λUi
}
(12)
As a result, the conclusions are very similar to those obtained under normative analysis:
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1. No rent to the firms’ mangers: U1 = U2 = 0. Thus, (1 − α)tPi + αtRi = ψ(ei) + zi, for
i = 1, 2.
2. Marginal utility of effort is equal to its marginal cost savings: ψ′(ei) = qi⇐⇒e1 = e2 =
e∗, implying that the effort is equal in the two regions, and attains its optimal level.
3. Marginal utility and marginal costs of the public good are equalized, and spillovers are
internalized: S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi−ei
δ
.
4. Note that the condition for ‘poor’ consumers is satisfied with the binding constraint,
while before it was slack, as is still the case for ‘rich’ consumers (who appropriate all
the benefits); this is due to the presence of price discrimination. Thus, δ(1−α)S(qi)−
(1 + λ)(1− α) [(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi] = 0.
Pro-consumer
Since the population is composed of citizens who are all consumers (even though different
categories: rich and poor), the net consumer surplus is fully weighed, as well as the manager’s
utility. Instead, the politician being pro-consumer, he does not weigh the shareholders’ utility
in the social welfare function; only their participation constraint will be satisfied. Here price
discrimination is not implemented, given that all citizens are consumers.
max
(qi,ei)
2∑
i=1
{
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)(ti + Ci) + Ui
}
(13)
s.t. Vi = δS(qi)− (1 + λ)(ti + Ci) > 0,
Ui = αt
R
i + (1− α)tPi − ψ(ei)− zi > 0,
zi ≥ 0, for i=1,2.
The expected welfare in this case becomes:
W =
2∑
i=1
{
δS(qi)− (1 + λ) [Ci + zi + ψ(ei)]− λUi
}
(14)
yielding results which are the same for points 1, 2 and 3, as under a pro-shareholder
central government. They are also the results achieved under a benevolent central planner
with complete information. Thus, no rent is left to the firm, the levels of effort are optimal
and the spillovers are internalized.
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The difference with respect to the solution with a pro-shareholder politician is the fact that
price discrimination is not implemented and the citizens’ participation constraints (for both
rich and poor citizens) are slack: δS(qi)− (1 + λ) [(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi] ≥ 0. This
exact result is also obtained under a benevolent central planner with complete information.
Proposition 4. With a central government, under positive analysis and complete infor-
mation, nothing changes with respect to the normative analysis except for the fact that with
a pro-shareholder planner the rich citizens capture all the welfare.
5.1.2 Local government
In the case of local government, the regulator will only take into account the well-being of the
agents in his region. However, things change slightly with the maximization process, since
the regulator is also a shareholder. Thus, not only is zi weighed differently with respect to
the central government, but also an additional element representing the local government’s
revenue from the dividends is present in the social welfare function.
Pro-shareholder
With a pro-shareholder local government, as in case of central government, the net surplus
is taken into account only proportionally to the rich part of the population; the manager’s
utility is fully taken into account. However, shareholders’ utility is fully considered, since the
shares not owned by the citizens are property of the local government. Moreover, the value
of dividends distributed that is accrued by the government is an additional element in the
social welfare function.
max
(qi,ei)
αS(qi)− (1 + λ)α(tRi + Ci) + zi + Ui + (1− α)(1− r)zi (15)
s.t. (1− α)Vi = (1− α)
[
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)(tPi + Ci)
]
> 0,
Ui = αt
R
i + (1− α)tPi − ψ(ei)− zi > 0,
zi ≥ 0, for i=1,2.
This yields:
W = αS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)− 1− α
1 + λ
S(qi)
]
− λUi − λzi + (1− α)(1− r)zi
(16)
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with its maximization leading to the same results as those obtained with a central planner
under symmetric information. Thus, no rent is left to the firm and the transfer is designed so
that in each region αtRi + (1− α)tPi = ψ(ei) + zi. Moreover, the level of effort is optimal and
equates the marginal disutility to the marginal cost savings. The poor citizens’ participation
constraint is binding, so that δ(1−α)S(qi)−(1+λ)(1−α) [(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi] = 0,
given that price discrimination is impossible. The only difference with respect to the pro-
shareholder central regulator is that equalizing the marginal utility and the marginal cost of
the public good, spillovers are not internalized.
Nothing changes with respect to the solution obtained under decentralization with a
benevolent planner; even the retention rate is the same, since the government is also a
shareholder. This is due to the fact that the commitment of the local government to the
shareholders is visible only in the weight it assigns to the consumers’ net surplus, while the
weight given to the shareholders’ utility is the same as if the planner were benevolent, given
the fact that he owns the residual shares not owned by the citizens.
Pro-consumer
When the local government is pro-consumer, it fully accounts for the consumers’ net surplus
(i.e. for both rich and poor citizens) and for the manager’s utility, while it completely
ignores the shareholders’ utility; this is also true for the central pro-consumer government.
Nevertheless, being a shareholder as well, the government’s portion of distributed dividends is
considered in the social welfare function. The fact that the local government does not include
the shareholders’ utility in the social welfare function, even if it takes into account its income
from the distributed dividends, is due to the attempt to balance between its commitment
toward its voters (i.e. poor citizens) and its position as shareholder in the firm.
max
(qi,ei)
S(qi)− (1 + λ)(ti + Ci) + Ui + (1− α)(1− r)zi (17)
s.t. Vi = δS(qi)− (1 + λ)(ti + Ci) > 0,
Ui = αt
R
i + (1− α)tPi − ψ(ei)− zi > 0,
zi ≥ 0, for i=1,2.
W = S(qi)− (1 + λ) [(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei) + zi]− λUi + (1− α)(1− r)zi (18)
The results obtained are the same under the benevolent local regulator since there is no
price discrimination (so the participation constraints for both kinds of citizens are slack).
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However, now r = 1 − 1+λ
1−α
16. Since the government is pro-consumer, the rate at which
dividends are distributed decreases with the shares owned by the local government, also
a shareholder. This is again due to the mentioned need for the regulator to balance its
commitment to voters and to the shareholders board. As a result: rPC > rPS = rB (the
retention rate under a pro-consumer planner is greater than under a pro-shareholder planner,
which is the same as under a benevolent planner).
Proposition 5. Under local government, maximization under symmetric information
and a partisan planner leads to the same results as with the benevolent planner scenario, so
that no inefficiencies are introduced. As in the case of a pro-shareholder central planner,
poor citizens are taxed all their surplus. Moreover, the optimal retention rate under a pro-
consumer local planner changes, since he has to balance being a shareholder and also being a
left-wing politician.
To summarize, as in the case of a benevolent planner with complete information, the
resulting rent of the manager (1) and effort levels (2) are standard. Once again, the problem
of internalizing spillover effects (3) originates from choosing a federalist environment.
Citizens’ participation constraints (4) are binding (slack) under a pro-shareholder (pro-
consumer) planner, since under complete information price discrimination is possible. Thus,
with a right-wing government, the rich citizens appropriate all the surplus, as shown by the
results obtained by Laffont (1996).
The introduction of partisan planners in this background in which the local government
is also a shareholder in the firm, implies that no matter which political party is in power, the
local government always puts more weight on the shareholders’ utility. In other words, central
and local governments follow their political ideology in weighting the citizens’ net surplus
and the shareholders’ dividends. However, the local government -when pro-shareholder- also
takes into account its portion of shares; moreover, it always takes into account the monetary
value of distributed dividends. Naturally, in the complete information setting, this has an
effect only on the retention rate; while under incomplete information, this will also distort
the level of effort.
5.2 Incomplete information
Assuming that politicians in power are elected by citizens who vote for the candidate rep-
resenting their own category, different results arise depending on whether the politician is
16 Under the assumption that (1 + λ)(1− α) < 1.
5 Partisan politicians 26
pro-shareholder or pro-consumer. This is due to the fact that political inefficiencies (partisan
planner) interact with economic inefficiencies (asymmetric information on the efficiency pa-
rameter of the firm), affecting the distribution of information and consequently the trade-off
between efficiency and rent extraction.
In this Section, as already mentioned, discriminatory taxes are not feasible, otherwise
social welfare maximization would be achieved by extracting the entire surplus from the
minority of citizens, and the orientation of the political party in power would not entail any
effect on the regulatory policy.
The regulator chooses the level of transfers ti (βi(ei)), while the shareholders simultane-
ously and non cooperatively choose the level of dividends zi (βi(ei)): these are their contrac-
tual offers to the firm’s manager. For the procedure used in the maximization process see
Appendices D (asymmetric information, central government) and E (asymmetric information,
local government).
5.2.1 Central government
Pro-shareholder
A politician who favors shareholders maximizes the net surplus of that part of the population;
moreover, the shareholders’ and the manager’s utility are fully weighed.
Now, the planner must solve:
max
(q
i
,qi,ei,ei)
2∑
i=1
{
δα
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)α[ν((β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei))+
+ (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]− [αλ− (1− α)] νΦ(ei)
}
(19)
s.t.17
δαS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(20)
δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν [2λα− (1− α)]
1− ν Φ(ei) > 0 (21)
17 (19) is binding with µ(1− ν) as multiplier.
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Maximizing expected social welfare we obtain:
1. ∂L
∂qi
= 0 : S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi−ei
δ
⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
2. ∂L
∂q
i
= 0 :
S′(q
i
)
1+λ
=
β
i
−ei
δ
⇔ q
i
= q∗(β
i
− ei).
3. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : q
i
= ψ′(ei) ⇔ ei = e∗.
4. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei) + 1−αα(1+λ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)⇔ e∗ > eCPS > eCB.
5. U i = Φ(ei) > 0, ti = ψ(e∗i ) + zi + Φ(ei).
6. U i = 0, t = ψ(ei) + zi.
As in the case of asymmetric information with a benevolent central politician (see Sub-
section 4.2.1), the multiprincipal problem induces the first of the two distortions visible in
point 4.
Moreover, when the central government is pro-shareholder, only a part of the population
appropriates the rent of the firm; and given that price discrimination is not possible, this
creates a second, positive, type of distortion, since a part of the firm is still owned by the local
government. This positive distortion decreases with the strength of the majority (i.e. the
higher α is) and with the shadow costs of public funds. Thus, with a pro-shareholder central
government, the fact that the local government still owns some shares has a positive effect
on the distortionary effect of asymmetric information, somehow protecting the poor citizens
from the government’s partisan behavior. Point 4 can also be written as: ψ′i(ei) = qi −
λ
α(1+λ)
ν
1−ν
[
α− 1−α
λ
]
Φ′(ei)− λ1+λ µ1+µ ν1−νΦ′(ei). It is now is more apparent that the distortion
is a combination of the multiprincipal problem and the impossibility of implementing price
discrimination, as in Laffont (1996).
Note that the distortion of effort for the inefficient firm is less than under a benevolent
planner given that the government is pro-shareholder: this fact mitigates the multiprincipal
problem, since the government (partly) works in the same direction of the shareholders.
Pro-consumer
The planner in this case favors all the citizens, but completely avoids to account for the
shareholders’ utility. So he must solve:
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max
(q
i
,qi,ei,ei)
2∑
i=1
{
δ
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)[ν((β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei))+
+ (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]− λνΦ(ei)
}
(22)
s.t.18.
δS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> δS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(23)
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν(1 + 2λ)
1− ν Φ(ei) > 0 (24)
Yielding:
1. ∂L
∂qi
= 0 : S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi − ei ⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
2. ∂L
∂q
i
= 0 :
S′(q
i
)
1+λ
= β
i
− ei ⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
3. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : q
i
= ψ′(ei) ⇔ ei = e∗.
4. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : ψ′i(ei) = qi− λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)− µ(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)⇔ e∗ > eCPS > eCB > eCPC .
5. U i = Φ(ei) > 0, ti = ψ(e∗i ) + zi + Φ(ei).
6. U i = 0, t = ψ(ei) + zi.
In this case, the second element of distortion in point 4 is due to the fact that the effort
of the manager is reduced if the government does not take into account the effect that the
shareholders’ no shut down condition has on the manager’s utility; note that this element is
also present in the basic model for the central government, but is weighed by (1− α), since
the government in that case gives a (reduced) weight to the shareholder’s utility (equal to
α) in its social welfare function, while now its weight in the social welfare function is equal
to zero (so the distortion’s weight equals one).
As a result, the level of effort for the inefficient firm’s manager is even lower than under a
benevolent planner. Given that the government completely ignores the shareholders’ utility,
18 (22) is binding with µ(1− ν) as multiplier.
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this exacerbates the multiprincipal problem: the central regulator and the shareholders board
move in opposite directions when giving incentives increasing the measure of distortion.
Thus, even if the government tries to favour its citizens by ignoring the shareholders’
utility, the fact that it does not consider the system as a whole, results in lower incentives
for the manager and lower level of effort than under a benevolent planner.
Proposition 6. Under a central partisan planner and asymmetric information, the level
of effort is distorted further downwards if the politician is pro-consumer, while the distortion
is mitigated when he is pro-shareholder. This is due to the fact that, while under a benevolent
planner the no shut-down condition imposed by the shareholders is weighed only for their
voting portion in the population (α), now the partisan planner oscillates between no weight
(when pro-consumer) and full weight (when pro-shareholder) toward their utility.
5.2.2 Local government
Pro-shareholder
Recalling that local government cannot internalize the spillovers, and that it is a shareholder
as well, the planner must now solve:
max
(q
i
,qi,ei,ei)
α
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)α[ν((β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei))+
+ (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]− [αλ− (1− α)] νΦ(ei) (25)
s.t.19.
αS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> αS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(26)
αS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
+
ν(1− α)(1− r)
1− ν Φ(ei) > 0 (27)
The solution of the maximization problem leads to the following results:
1. ∂L
∂qi
= 0 : S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi − ei ⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
2. ∂L
∂q
i
= 0 :
S′(q
i
)
1+λ
= β
i
− ei ⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
19 (25) is binding with µ(1− ν) as multiplier.
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3. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : q
i
= ψ′(ei) ⇔ ei = e∗.
4. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+λ)α ν1−ν(1+µ)
[
α− 1−α
λ
]
Φ′(ei) +
(1−α)(1−r)µ
(1+λ)(1+µ)α
ν
1−νΦ
′(ei) ⇔ e∗ >
ePSL > e
B
L .
5. U i = Φ(ei) > 0, ti = ψ(e∗i ) + zi + Φ(ei).
6. U i = 0, t = ψ(ei) + zi.
Looking at result 4, the second element on the right hand side of the equation is the
distortion described in Laffont (1996): it is generated by the government’s inability to use
price discrimination. In this case, there is also an additional weight
(
1
α(1+µ)
)
which represents
the importance of the satisfaction of the aggregate veto constraint for the shareholders.
However, in this case, the distortion also depends on the presence of the aggregate veto
constraint, given the presence of a multiprincipal problem which is absent in Laffont’s model.
The third element on the right hand side of equation 4, mitigates the distortion, and measures
the effect on the aggregate veto constraint of the local government also being a shareholder.
Recall that the local government is not only a regulator, but also a member of the shareholders
board of the firm, and its power depends on the shares owned.
Thus, when the regulator maximizes, his objectives are not so much at odds with those of
the shareholders (in the present case he is also pro-shareholder by election), and this partially
helps to solve the multiprincipal problem.
However, given that the government is pro-shareholder, α ∈ [1/2; 1], meaning that the
shareholders board is dominated by citizen-shareholders (who also voted for the current local
government), the government has a minority portion of the shares, and, hence, the beneficial
effect is not so high.
Now, the level of effort is greater with respect to the benevolent framework, since price
discrimination is not possible. But the fact that the regulator is pro-shareholder dampens
the problem since he and the shareholders push in the same direction. So, the fact that there
are two principals is not a big issue, as long as the two have similar objectives. Note that
the mitigation of the multiprincipal problem, due to the presence of the local government on
the shareholders board, is not so high and is maximized when the portion of shares owned
by the government converges with the portion of those owned by the citizens (i.e. the other
shareholders are not so powerful with respect to the local shareholders in managing the firm).
The retention rate is now r = 2 − α
1−αλ
20: notice that this is reasonable, since the
20 Under the condition that λ ≤ 2(1−α)α .
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government is pro-shareholder (thus, α > 1/2) and the second element on the right hand side
of the equation is always greater than one.
Pro-consumer
The pro-consumer local planner must solve:
max
(q
i
,qi,ei,ei)
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)− (1 + λ)[ν((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))+
+ (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]− λνΦ(ei) (28)
s.t.21.
S(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(29)
S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν(1 + 2λ)
1− ν Φ(ei) + (1− α)(1− r)
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0
(30)
yielding:
1. ∂L
∂qi
= 0 : S
′(qi)
1+λ
= βi − ei ⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
2. ∂L
∂q
i
= 0 :
S′(q
i
)
1+λ
= β
i
− ei ⇔ qi = q∗(βi − ei).
3. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : q
i
= ψ′(ei) ⇔ ei = e∗.
4. ∂L
∂ei
= 0 : ψ′i(ei) = qi− λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)− [1−(1−α)(1−r)]µ(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)⇔ e∗ > ePSL > eBL >
ePCL .
5. U i = Φ(ei) > 0, ti = ψ(e∗i ) + zi + Φ(ei).
6. U i = 0, t = ψ(ei) + zi.
21 (28) is binding with µ(1− ν) as multiplier.
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The level of effort obtained is even lower than under a benevolent planner: given that the
local government has the majority of shares, it can decide without taking into account the
incentives of the rest of the board. So, if on one hand this allows access to information and
less contrast with the shareholders’ objectives, on the other hand the government is left-wing,
and has objectives (e.g. redistribution) which are different from those of the shareholders,
creating greater conflict than with the benevolent planner.
Hence, the retention rate that the local government would choose is r = 1, since as a
left-wing politician, the local planner ignores the shareholders’ utility, and as a shareholder
he decides that is better not to distribute dividends. Even though this scenario seems quite
strong, it could be explained by the fact that the local government, when trying to balance
its commitment to its voters and to the shareholders board, favours the first, since the
distribution of dividends can be perceived as a signal of disloyalty to the electoral mandate
by the poor citizens.
In other words, since the citizen-shareholders are the majority on the shareholder board,
they will vote for a level of r which is lower than one. However, it can be predicted that the
value of the expected distributed dividends, when the government is left-wing, is less than
under a right-wing government, since it would be the result of an attempt to balance the
retention rate desired by the local government and the private shareholders.
Proposition 7. Under asymmetric information and a local partisan planner, the effort
is further distorted downward for both the pro-consumer and the pro-shareholder planner.
In the latter case, the direction of the distortion is opposite with respect to the central pro-
shareholder regulator and is due to the fact that the local government is also a shareholder,
but cannot use price discrimination.
The result that the incentive scheme is less powerful under a pro-consumer planner is
also reached by Laffont (1996). He emphasizes that moving from a left-wing to a right-wing
party, strengthens incentives and increases the level of effort.
Note: the result that effort under a centralized regulator is distorted upward/downward
with respect to its utilitarian level when the regulator is pro-shareholder/consumer is in line
with the findings in Laffont and Pouyet (2003). However, in Laffont and Pouyet model,
competition between politicians when regulation is decentralized (due to the fact that there
is a single firm producing for both regions) avoids fluctuations so the level of effort under the
local regulators is the same, whichever party is in power. In contrast, in the Author’s model,
there is no regulatory competition given that each region has its own firm operating in its
territory. The direction of the distortion in the levels of effort, due to the introduction of
5 Partisan politicians 33
Tab. 6: Effort distortion for the inefficient firm
Benevolent
Central ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)− (1−α)µ(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)
Local ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei) + (1−α)(1−r)µ(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)
Pro-shareholder
Central ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei) + 1−αα(1+λ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)
Local ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+λ)(1+µ)α ν1−ν
[
α− 1−α
λ
]
Φ′(ei) +
(1−α)(1−r)µ
(1+λ)(1+µ)α
ν
1−νΦ
′(ei)
Pro-consumer
Central ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)− µ(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)
Local ψ′i(ei) = qi − λ(1+2µ)(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)− [1−(1−α)(1−r)]µ(1+λ)(1+µ) ν1−νΦ′(ei)
an electoral stage, is the same as under centralization, but it is somehow magnified/reduced
(depending on the case) with respect to the central level since the local regulator is also a
shareholder, and has a kind of ‘double personal agenda’ (one as a politician committed to
his voters and one as a member of the shareholders board). Indeed, it is easy to show that
e∗ > e¯PSL > e
PS
C > e¯
B
L > e
B
C > e
PC
C > e
PC
L . The main results of all the scenarios of the model
under asymmetric information are represented in Table 6.
One would think that a pro-consumer government, which has redistribution as its main
target would be the one to obtain the level of effort nearest to the optimum. However,
following Perotti (1995), the Author considers that the left-wing government -even if it is a
shareholder in the firm- is seen by the manager as not committed to not redistributing the
firm’s profits (even those to the other shareholders), and this affects the firm performance, as
empirically demonstrated by Boubakri et al. (2009). Moreover, right-wing governments are
traditionally seen as more likely to implement market-oriented reforms, another motivation
to believe they are more committed.
5.3 Political alignment between central and local level
Up to now the Author has assumed that the center and the regions do not communicate nor
share any information, and the possibility that they do not belong to the same political party
in power has not been considered (or has been assumed to have no consequence).
Here, on the contrary, a sort of political competition between the local and the central
government is introduced. We can expect that the fact that the political party in power at
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the local level is the same as (or the opposition) at the central level has a positive (negative)
effect on the shadow costs of public funds.
Suppose that the level of λ, taken in consideration in the previous Section, is attained
when it is assumed that the political alignment/disalignment between the center and the
periphery is of no consequence. Then, let us assume that an increase/decrease in the level of
the shadow costs of public funds λ is due to the mentioned political disalignment /alignment.
This can be justified in terms of compatibility between levels of government, due to common
ideology, agenda and political programme, and also in terms of a greater ease, for example,
for the two levels of government to come to an agreement, or for the local government to
obtain additional funds.
To see which would be the final direction of the distortion due to an increase/decrease of
the shadow costs of public funds, let us differentiate with respect to λ the results obtained
on partisan planners.
For any level of decentralization and any political party in power, points 1 and 2 of the
solution (i.e. related to the marginal utility of the public good’s production for both the effi-
cient and inefficient firm) are always negatively/positively distorted by an increase/decrease
of λ: ∂L/∂qi
∂λ
= βi − ei.
As for point 4, the components of the distortion of the marginal disutility of effort for the
inefficient firm with respect to its optimal level are different and go in different directions,
requiring a case by case analysis.
With a central pro-shareholder planner we have:
∂L/∂ei
∂λ
= − 1
(1+λ)2
1+2µ
1+µ
ν
1−νΦ
′(ei)− 1(1+λ)2 1−αα ν1−νΦ′(ei),
while with a central pro-consumer planner we have:
∂L/∂ei
∂λ
= − 1
(1+λ)2
1+2µ
1+µ
ν
1−νΦ
′(ei) + 1(1+λ)2
µ
1+µ
ν
1−νΦ
′(ei).
Thus, an increase in the shadow costs of public funds has an effect which can be de-
composed in two parts. The first part is common among political parties and has the same
(negative) intensity: an increase in λ increments the distortion imposed by the presence of
the multiprincipal problem. The second component reinforces (mitigates) the negative effect
of an increase in λ, depending on whether the politician is pro-shareholder or pro-consumer.
The negative effect under a pro-shareholder planner is due to the fact that the protection
of poor citizens provided by the residual shares not owned by the voters comes at an in-
creasing cost (since price discrimination is not possible), while the positive effect, under a
pro-consumer planner, is due to the fact that, as λ increases, the regulator perceives that
ignoring the shareholders’ no shut-down condition can have bad consequences on the multi-
principal problem. Naturally, the directions of the distortions due to a decrease in the shadow
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costs of public funds would be of opposite sign and equal intensity.
With local pro-shareholder and pro-consumer politicians, the variations due to an increase
in λ are respectively:
∂L/∂ei
∂λ
= − 1
(1+λ)2
1
1+µ
ν
1−νΦ
′(ei)− 1(1+λ)2 11+µ 1−αα ν1−νΦ′(ei)− 1(1+λ)2 (1−α)(1−r)α µ1+µ ν1−νΦ′(ei)
and ∂L/∂ei
∂λ
= − 1
(1+λ)2
1+2µ
1+µ
ν
1−νΦ
′(ei)− 1(1+λ)2 µ1+µ ν1−νΦ′(ei)− (1−α)(1−r)(1+λ)2 µ1+µ ν1−νΦ′(ei).
In the pro-shareholder regulator case, the second component represents the fact that the
impossibility of making price discrimination comes at an increasing cost when the shadow
costs of public funds increment, while the first and the second components should be put
together to represent the growing cost of the multiprincipal problem, worsened by the fact
that the more it is costly to make transfers to the firm, the higher should be the shares of
the local government. In the pro-consumer regulator case, the first part is the one related to
the multiprincipal problem, while the last two represent the fact that a positive effect can be
obtained when not all the shares are owned by the local government -which has objectives
opposed to those of the shareholders- so that the multiprincipal conflict is mitigated; this
comes at a higher cost when λ is high.
6 Conclusion
This study is motivated by the -worldwide- phenomenon of reluctant privatization, which
in many cases is mainly at the local level. Local governments, retaining some stakes in the
firm, can influence the operative, economic and financial choices of the firm (i.e. imposing
the distribution of dividends when needed), but they also regulate the firm. Hence, the local
government still retains control of the firm which provides the service in its jurisdiction.
This can raise some doubts on the efficacy of the privatization process and consequently on
externalizing the local services provision. The objectives of cost reduction and simplification,
given the present situation, are unlikely to be reached. So, the fact that local politicians are
eager to acquire and retain stakes in the firms lessens the transparency in the relationship
between the private and the public sector in the implementation of the regulatory rules, and
finally in the democratic representation of the citizens’ interests.
Even if this anomaly, that characterizes many local governments in Italy and Europe,
has been subject to various (mainly empirical) studies, none of them as of yet have tried to
model what this would imply for the choice of the optimal regulatory rule, nor for the vertical
allocation of regulatory tasks among the various levels of government.
In the present model, the Author has attempted to fill this missing point in the literature,
using a methodology which demonstrates how asymmetric information interacts not only with
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political inefficiencies, but also with the degree of decentralization, providing some insights
on a problem which is still at the center of the academic debate. What emerges is that a local
regulator is -in the majority of cases- better than a central one, even if he is a shareholder in
the regulated firm. Thus, the application of the subsidiarity principle has a beneficial effect
on regulation, even in case of municipal capitalism. As noted before, this is true for both the
benevolent and the pro-shareholder planner. However, with a pro-consumer government, the
higher the level of regulation, the better it is. This is due to what can be called the curse of
the myopic attitude of left-wing governments that, acting in the interest of citizens, end up in
a situation which worsens instead of improves their constituents’ situation, since they do not
take the shareholders’ interests enough into consideration. The shareholders fate is (especially
in Italy) closely and obscurely entwined with that of politicians. Moreover, it should be
pointed out that, in the majority of cases, in Italy it has been the left-wing government
which has implemented privatizations. This is the result of pressure from entrepreneurs, who
were eager to acquire the firms once the State withdrawed, and the government’s need to get
money in order to alleviate the problem of public finances in a period when the application of
the Maastricht rules was particularly rigid. This may be related to the fact that the retention
rate is lower when the local government is pro-consumer.
The research agenda in this line of research is still rich: other formalizations on regulatory
problems can be added, as well as the problem of cross-subsidization between firms (and
consequently, between jurisdictions). Other levels of government could be introduced, and
the ownership of some shares by the central government could be hypothesized. More than
just two groups of citizens can be taken into consideration, in order to generalize the results,
and the introduction of re-election constraints and the reputational effects can show how the
problem would change in a dynamic environment.
7 Appendix
Appendix A- Complete information, central government
W =
2∑
i=1
{
δS(qi)− (1 + λ) (ti + (βi − ei)qi) + αzi+ (ti − ψ(ei)− zi)
}
=
=
2∑
i=1
{
δS(qi)− λti − (1 + λ)Ci − (1− α)zi − ψ(ei)
}
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Adding and subtracting λ(ψ(ei) + zi), we obtain:
W =
2∑
i=1
{
δS(qi)− (1 + λ) (Ci + ψ(ei))− (1− α)zi − λ (αzi + (1− α)zi)− λ (ti − ψ(ei)− zi)
}
=
=
2∑
i=1
{
δS(qi)− (1 + λ) [(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi]− λαzi − λUi
}
Appendix B - incomplete information, basic model
In the incomplete information environment the important equations and constraints for the
manager are:
Utility: Ui(βi) = ti(βi)− ψ(ei(βi))− zi(βi).
Participation Constraints: U i > U i + Φ(ei), U i > 0.
Incentive Compatibility constraints: ti = ψ(ei) + zi + U i, ti = ψ(ei) + zi + U i.
The rent for the manager of the efficient firm is Φ(ei) = ψ(ei)− ψ(ei −∆βi).
Citizens also have the participation constraint (so they cannot vote with their feet), that is:
V (qi) ≥ 0.
Central government
Regulator’s best response to the shareholder’s dividend scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
2∑
i=1
{
δ
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ) [ν(Ci + ti) + (1− ν)(Ci + ti)]+
+ α [νzi + (1− ν)zi] +
[
νU i + (1− ν)U i
]}
(31)
subject to the managers’ ICs and PCs and the citizens’ PCs.
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The expected welfare with a centralized solution under a benevolent planner is:
E(WBC ) =
2∑
i=1
{
δ
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)[ν(Ci + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi)+
+ (1− ν)(Ci + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi)]− λα [νzi + (1− ν)zi]− λνΦ(ei)
}
(32)
Shareholder’s best response to the regulatory scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
ν(ti − ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)(ti − ψ(ei))−
[
νU i + (1− ν)U i
]
(33)
subject to the managers’ ICs and PCs.
Recall: Ui = ti − ψ(ei)− zi ⇒ zi = (ti − ψ(ei)− Ui).
Given the two schemes ti(βi) and zi(βi), the manager must also make the equilibrium choices
of quantities qi:
qi ∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
q
i
∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
∗∗∗
By maximizing the regulator’s objective, for the manager to choose qi = q∗i , it should be
that:
δS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
− [(1 + λ)(1− α) + αλ] zi > δS(qi)+
− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
− [(1 + λ)(1− α) + αλ] zi (34)
and, not to have too high dividends given to the shareholders nor to shut down the inefficient
firm, we should have:
δ
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)[ν((β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi)+
+(1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi)]− λα [νzi + (1− ν)zi]− λνΦ(ei) >
δνS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)ν[(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei) + (1− α)zi]− λανzi
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=⇒ δS(qi)− (1 + λ)[(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)]− [(1 + λ)(1− α) + αλ] zi −
ν
1− ν λΦ(ei) > 0 (35)
The conditions to characterize the shareholder’s best response:
ti − ψ(βi − Ci) > ti − ψ(βi − Ci) (36)
ν(ti − ψ(βi − Ci)) + (1− ν)(ti − ψ(βi − Ci))− νΦ(ei) > ν(ti − ψ(βi − Ci))
⇒ ti − ψ(βi − Ci)−
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0 (37)
The last condition is needed, so that shareholders (if the transfer is high enough) do not veto
the production to the inefficient firm.
Plus:
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = U i + Φ(ei) (38)
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = 0 (39)
Using constraints (34), (36) and (38), we obtain:
δS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> δS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(40)
i.e. there is an output pair, (qi, qi), which is implementable as a Nash equilibrium of the
common agency game.
Then, using conditions (35), (37) and (39), we obtain:
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν [2λ+ (1− α)]
1− ν Φ(ei) > 0 (41)
This is the aggregate veto constraint, characterizing the quantity that could be implemented
in the inefficient firm: it is binding, with µ(1− ν) as multiplier.
So the Lagrangian of the problem is:
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L =
2∑
i=1
{
δ
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)[ν((β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei))+
+ (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]− λνΦ(ei)+
+ µ(1− ν)
[
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))−
ν [2λ+ (1− α)]
1− ν Φ(ei)
]}
(42)
Local government
Regulator’s best response to the shareholder’s dividend scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)− (1 + λ)[ν(Ci + ti) + (1− ν)(Ci + ti)]+
+ [νzi + (1− ν)zi] +
[
νU i + (1− ν)U i
]
+ (1− α)(1− r) [νzi + (1− ν)zi] (43)
subject to the manager’s ICs and PCs and the citizens’ PCs.
The expected welfare with a decentralized solution under a benevolent planner is:
E(WBL ) = νS(qi) + (1− ν)S(qi)− (1 + λ)[ν(Ci + ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)(Ci + ψ(ei))]+
− λ [νzi + (1− ν)zi]− λνΦ(ei) + (1− α)(1− r) [νzi + (1− ν)zi] (44)
Shareholder’s best response to the regulatory scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
ν(ti − ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)(ti − ψ(ei))−
[
νU i + (1− ν)U i
]
(45)
subject to the manager’s ICs and PCs.
Recall: Ui = ti − ψ(ei)− zi ⇒ zi = (ti − ψ(ei)− Ui).
Given the two schemes ti(βi) and zi(βi), the manager must also make the equilibrium
choices of quantities qi:
qi ∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
q
i
∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
∗∗∗
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By maximizing the regulator’s objective, for the manager to choose qi = q∗i , it should be
that:
S(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
− [λ− (1− α)(1− r)] zi >
S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
− [λ− (1− α)(1− r)] zi (46)
and, not to have too high dividends given to the shareholders nor to shut down the
inefficient firm, we should have:
S(qi)− (1 + λ)[(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)]− [λ− (1− α)(1− r)] zi −
ν
1− ν λΦ(ei) > 0 (47)
The conditions to characterize the shareholder’s best response:
ti − ψ(βi − Ci) > ti − ψ(βi − Ci) (48)
ti − ψ(βi − Ci)−
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0 (49)
The last condition is needed, so that shareholders (if the transfer is high enough) do not
veto the production to the inefficient firm.
Plus:
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = U i + Φ(ei) (50)
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = 0 (51)
Using conditions (46) and (48), together with
condition (50), we obtain:
S(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(52)
i.e. there is an output pair, (qi, qi), which is implementable as a Nash equilibrium of the
common agency game. Using constraints (47), (49) and (51), we get:
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S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν2λ
1− νΦ(ei) + (1− α)(1− r)
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0 (53)
This is the aggregate veto constraint, characterizing the quantity that could be imple-
mented in the inefficient firm.
The Lagrangian is:
L = νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)− (1 + λ)[ν((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]+
− λνΦ(ei) + µ(1− ν)
[
S(qi)− (1 + λ)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))−
ν [2λ− (1− α)(1− r)]
1− ν Φ(ei)
]
Appendix C - partisan planner, complete information
Central government
W =
2∑
i=1
{
δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
(
tRi + (βi − ei)qi
)
+ αzi+
(
αtRi + (1− α)tPi − ψ(ei)− zi
)}
=
=
2∑
i=1
{
δαS(qi)− λαtRi − (1 + λ)αCi + (1− α)tPi − zi + αzi − ψ(ei)
}
Adding and subtracting λ(ψ(ei) + zi), and λ(1− α)tPi we obtain:
W =
2∑
i=1
{
δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)
(
αCi + ψ(ei)− (1− α)zi − (1− α)tPi
)− λαzi − λ (ti − ψ(ei)− zi)} =
=
2∑
i=1
{
δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)− (1− α)zi − 1− α
1 + λ
δS(qi)
]
− λαzi − λUi
}
Appendix D - partisan planner, incomplete information, central
government
Pro-shareholder
Regulator’s best response to the shareholder’s dividend scheme is:
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max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
2∑
i=1
{
δα
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)α[ν(Ci + ti)+
+(1− ν)(Ci + ti)] + α [νzi + (1− ν)zi] +
[
νU i + (1− ν)U i
]}
(54)
U i > 0, (a), U i > U i + Φ(ei) (b), Vi > 0 (c),
ti = zi + ψ(ei) + U i (d), ti = zi + ψ(ei) + U i (e).
The expected welfare with a centralized solution under a pro-shareholder planner is:
E(W PSC ) =
2∑
i=1
{
δα
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)α[ν(Ci + ψ(ei))+
+ (1− ν)(Ci + ψ(ei))]− [αλ− (1− α)] νΦ(ei)− αλ [νzi + (1− ν)zi]
}
(55)
Shareholder’s best response to the regulatory scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
ν(ti − ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)(ti − ψ(ei))−
[
νU i + (1− ν)U i
]
(56)
s.t. (a), (b), (d), (e).
Recall: Ui = ti − ψ(ei)− zi ⇒ zi = (ti − ψ(ei)− Ui).
Given the two schemes ti(βi) and zi(βi), the manager must also make the equilibrium
choices of quantities qi:
qi ∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
q
i
∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
∗∗∗
By maximizing the regulator’s objective, for the manager to choose qi = q∗i , it should be
that:
δαS(q
i
)−(1+λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
−λαzi > δαS(qi)−(1+λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
−λαzi
(57)
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and, not to have too high dividends given to the shareholders nor to shut down the
inefficient firm, we should have:
δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)α[(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)]− λαzi −
ν
1− ν [αλ− (1− α)] Φ(ei) > 0 (58)
The conditions to characterize the shareholder’s best response:
ti − ψ(βi − Ci) > ti − ψ(βi − Ci) (59)
ti − ψ(βi − Ci)−
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0 (60)
The last condition is needed, so that shareholders (if the transfer is high enough) do not
veto the production to the inefficient firm.
Plus:
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = U i + Φ(ei) (61)
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = 0 (62)
Using constraints (57), (59) and (61), we obtain:
δαS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(63)
i.e. there is an output pair, (qi, qi), which is implementable as a Nash equilibrium of the
common agency game.
Then, using conditions (58), (60) and (62), we obtain:
δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν [2λα− (1− α)]
1− ν Φ(ei) > 0 (64)
This is the aggregate veto constraint, characterizing the quantity that could be imple-
mented in the inefficient firm.
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L =
2∑
i=1
{
δα
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)α[ν((β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei))+
+ (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]− [αλ− (1− α)] νΦ(ei)+
+ µ(1− ν)
[
δαS(qi)− (1 + λ)α((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))−
ν [2λα− (1− α)]
1− ν Φ(ei)
]}
(65)
Pro-consumers
Regulator’s best response to the shareholder’s dividend scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
2∑
i=1
{
δ
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)[ν(Ci + ti) + (1− ν)(Ci + ti)]+
+
[
νU i + (1− ν)U i
]}
(66)
U i > 0, (a), U i > U i + Φ(ei) (b), Vi > 0 (c),
ti = zi + ψ(ei) + U i (d), ti = zi + ψ(ei) + U i (e).
The expected welfare with a centralized solution under a pro-consumer planner is:
E(W PCC ) =
2∑
i=1
{
δ
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)[ν(Ci + ψ(ei) + zi)+
+ (1− ν)(Ci + ψ(ei) + zi)]− λνΦ(ei)
}
(67)
Shareholder’s best response to the regulatory scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
[
ν(ti − ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)(ti − ψ(ei))
]− [νU i + (1− ν)U i] (68)
s.t. (a), (b), (d), (e).
Recall: Ui = ti − ψ(ei)− zi ⇒ zi = (ti − ψ(ei)− Ui).
Given the two schemes ti(βi) and zi(βi), the manager must also make the equilibrium
choices of quantities qi:
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qi ∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
q
i
∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
∗∗∗
By maximizing the regulator’s objective, for the manager to choose qi = q∗i , it should be
that:
δS(q
i
)−(1+λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
−(1+λ)zi > δS(qi)−(1+λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
−(1+λ)zi
(69)
and, not to have too high dividends given to the shareholders nor to shut down the
inefficient firm, we should have:
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)[(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)]− (1 + λ)zi −
ν
1− ν λΦ(ei) > 0 (70)
The conditions to characterize the shareholder’s best response:
ti − ψ(βi − Ci) > ti − ψ(βi − Ci) (71)
ti − ψ(βi − Ci)−
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0 (72)
The last condition is needed, so that shareholders (if the transfer is high enough) do not
veto the production to the inefficient firm.
Plus:
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = U i + Φ(ei) (73)
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = 0 (74)
Using conditions (69) and (71), together with condition (73), we obtain:
δS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> δS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(75)
i.e. there is an output pair, (qi, qi), which is implementable as a Nash equilibrium of the
common agency game. Using constraints (70), (72) and (74), we get:
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δS(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν(1 + 2λ)
1− ν Φ(ei) > 0 (76)
This is the aggregate veto constraint, characterizing the quantity that could be imple-
mented in the inefficient firm.
L =
2∑
i=1
{
δ
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)[ν((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]+
− λνΦ(ei) + µ(1− ν)
[
δS(qi)− (1 + λ)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))−
ν(1 + 2λ)
1− ν Φ(ei)
]}
(77)
Appendix E - partisan planner, incomplete information, local
government
Pro-shareholder
Regulator’s best response to the shareholder’s dividend scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
α
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)α[ν(Ci + ti) + (1− ν)(Ci + ti)]+
+ [νzi + (1− ν)zi] +
[
νU i + (1− ν)U i
]
+ (1− α)(1− r) [νzi + (1− ν)zi] (78)
U i > 0, (a), U i > U i + Φ(ei) (b), Vi > 0 (c),
ti = zi + ψ(ei) + U i (d), ti = zi + ψ(ei) + U i (e).
The expected welfare with a decentralized solution under a pro-shareholder planner is:
E(W PSL ) = α
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)α[ν(Ci + ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)(Ci + ψ(ei))]+
+ [(1− α)− αλ] νΦ(ei)− [αλ+ (1− α)r] [νzi + (1− ν)zi] (79)
Shareholder’s best response to the regulatory scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
[
ν(ti − ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)(ti − ψ(ei))
]− [νU i + (1− ν)U i] (80)
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s.t. (a), (b), (d), (e).
Recall: Ui = ti − ψ(ei)− zi ⇒ zi = (ti − ψ(ei)− Ui).
Given the two schemes ti(βi) and zi(βi), the manager must also make the equilibrium
choices of quantities qi:
qi ∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
q
i
∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
∗∗∗
By maximizing the regulator’s objective, for the manager to choose qi = q∗i , it should be
that:
αS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
− [αλ+ (1− α)r] zi >
αS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
− [αλ+ (1− α)r] zi (81)
and, not to have too high dividends given to the shareholders nor to shut down the
inefficient firm, we should have:
αS(qi)−(1+λ)α[(βi−ei)qi+ψ(ei)]−[αλ+ (1− α)r] zi−
ν
1− ν [(1− α)− αλ] Φ(ei) > 0 (82)
The conditions to characterize the shareholder’s best response:
ti − ψ(βi − Ci) > ti − ψ(βi − Ci) (83)
ti − ψ(βi − Ci)−
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0 (84)
The last condition is needed, so that shareholders (if the transfer is high enough) do not
veto the production to the inefficient firm.
Plus:
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = U i + Φ(ei) (85)
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = 0 (86)
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Using conditions (81) and (83), together with condition (85), we obtain:
αS(q
i
)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> αS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(87)
i.e. there is an output pair, (qi, qi), which is implementable as a Nash equilibrium of the
common agency game. Using constraints (82), (84) and (86), we get:
αS(qi)− (1 + λ)α
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
+
ν(1− α)(1− r)
1− ν Φ(ei) > 0 (88)
This is the aggregate veto constraint, characterizing the quantity that could be imple-
mented in the inefficient firm.
L = α
[
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)
]
− (1 + λ)α[ν((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]+
−[αλ− (1− α)] νΦ(ei)+µ(1−ν)
[
αS(qi)− (1 + λ)α((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)) +
ν(1− α)(1− r)
1− ν Φ(ei)
]
(89)
Pro-consumers
Regulator’s best response to the shareholder’s dividend scheme is:
max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)− (1 + λ)[ν(Ci + ti) + (1− ν)(Ci + ti)]+
+
[
νU i + (1− ν)U i
]
+ (1− α)(1− r) [νzi + (1− ν)zi] (90)
U i > 0, (a), U i > U i + Φ(ei) (b), Vi > 0 (c),
ti = zi + ψ(ei) + U i (d), ti = zi + ψ(ei) + U i (e).
The expected welfare with a decentralized solution under a pro-consumer planner is:
E(W PCL ) = νS(qi) + (1− ν)S(qi)− (1 + λ)[ν(Ci + ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)(Ci + ψ(ei))]+
− λνΦ(ei)− [1 + λ− (1− α)(1− r)] [νzi + (1− ν)zi] (91)
Shareholder’s best response to the regulatory scheme is:
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max
{(q
i
,U i);(qi,U i)}
[
ν(ti − ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)(ti − ψ(ei))
]− [νU i + (1− ν)U i] (92)
s.t. (a), (b), (d), (e).
Recall: Ui = ti − ψ(ei)− zi ⇒ zi = (ti − ψ(ei)− Ui).
Given the two schemes ti(βi) and zi(βi), the manager must also make the equilibrium
choices of quantities qi:
qi ∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
q
i
∈ argmax
qi
ti(qi(βi))− zi(qi(βi))− ψ(ei)
∗∗∗
By maximizing the regulator’s objective, for the manager to choose qi = q∗i , it should be
that:
S(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
− [1 + λ− (1− α)(1− r)] zi >
S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
− [1 + λ− (1− α)(1− r)] zi (93)
and, not to have too high dividends given to the shareholders nor to shut down the
inefficient firm, we should have:
S(qi)− (1 + λ)[(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)]− [1 + λ− (1− α)(1− r)] zi −
ν
1− ν λΦ(ei) > 0 (94)
The conditions to characterize the shareholder’s best response:
ti − ψ(βi − Ci) > ti − ψ(βi − Ci) (95)
ti − ψ(βi − Ci)−
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0 (96)
The last condition is needed, so that shareholders (if the transfer is high enough) do not
veto the production to the inefficient firm.
Plus:
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U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = U i + Φ(ei) (97)
U i = ti − ψ(βi − Ci)− zi = 0 (98)
Using conditions (93) and (95), together with condition (97), we obtain:
S(q
i
)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
> S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(β
i
− ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]
(99)
i.e. there is an output pair, (qi, qi), which is implementable as a Nash equilibrium of the
common agency game. Using constraints (94), (96) and (98), we get:
S(qi)− (1 + λ)
[
(βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)
]− ν(1 + 2λ)
1− ν Φ(ei) + (1− α)(1− r)
ν
1− νΦ(ei) > 0
(100)
This is the aggregate veto constraint, characterizing the quantity that could be imple-
mented in the inefficient firm.
L = νS(q
i
) + (1− ν)S(qi)− (1 + λ)[ν((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei)) + (1− ν)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))]+
− λνΦ(ei) + µ(1− ν)
[
S(qi)− (1 + λ)((βi − ei)qi + ψ(ei))−
ν [1 + 2λ+ (1− α)(1− r)]
1− ν Φ(ei)
]
(101)
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